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LEGISLATURES, COURTS AND THE SEC: REFLECTIONS ON
SILENCE AND POWER IN CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW
FAITH STEVELMAN KAHWN
A major focus of this essay' is the corporate law governing corporate
charitable giving.2 The essay begins by comparing the states' modern
corporate philanthropy laws to the laws which existed in the first half of
the twentieth century. As this historical comparison reveals, the modern
laws have conferred extraordinary power and discretionary authority on
individual corporate officers and boards of directors. In particular, the
modern laws have afforded corporate managers3 discretion to alienate
corporate assets for philanthropic purposes independent of commercial
objectives. This discretionary authority is unique within corporate law,
and it fits uncomfortably alongside the profit-driven, shareholder-centered
principles characteristic of this body of law.4
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank Carlin
Meyer, David Schoenbrod, Michael Sinclair and Harry Wellington for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. This essay represents a reconsideration of certain matters discussed in my article,
Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997) [hereinafter Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy], as well as my
first treatment of certain related issues.
2. The observations in this essay are confined to philanthropically motivated
contributions by corporations, that is, those which are not principally motivated by the
objective of maximizing corporate profit. This category includes all corporate donations
which are properly deducted under § 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, since only those
contributions made without the expectation of receiving a commensurate benefit qualify
for deductibility thereunder. In 1996, United States corporations deducted nearly $8.5
billion of charitable gifts under § 170. See AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING
USA 1997: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1996, at 94 (1997)
[hereinafter GIVING USA 1997]. (All references to the Code, unless otherwise specified,
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, I.R.C. § 1-9722 (the "Code" or
the "Tax Code")). For additional recent data on corporate charitable contributions, see
David R. Morgan, Trends in Corporate Charitable Contributions, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REv. 771 (1997).
3. The term is used herein to describe senior corporate officers and directors
collectively.
4. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK& DANIELR. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). The view that corporation law is fundamentally economic
and "private" in nature is widely accepted in mainstream corporate legal scholarship. For
commentary on this point, and description of the efforts of "progressive" corporate legal
scholars to broaden the discourse, see Carl Landauer, Book Review, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1693 (1996); Paul N. Cox, The Public, the Private and the Corporation, 80 MARQ. L.
REV. 391 (1997); see also infra note 87.
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But the modem philanthropy laws are also remarkable for the fact that
their significance is barely discernable from their language. The modern
laws, in sharp contrast to their historical antecedents, represent facially
unremarkable affirmations of corporate charitable power.5  Their
significance arises primarily from what they fail to say, and from the
limits and requirements which they fail to impose. Thus, in promulgating
these laws, the state legislatures have established a system under which
corporate managers may give away seemingly unlimited amounts of
corporate capital for charitable purposes, and they have done so without
having to be entirely explicit or candid about the dramatic changes which
they effectuated. In leaving most of the hard questions in the area
unaddressed, these laws reflect a kind of failure of responsibility on the
part of the legislatures.
The second section of the essay focuses on the judicial dilemma posed
by the silence in the philanthropy laws. Because state legislatures have
elected not to define the appropriate objectives, limitations, and decisional
processes which should pertain to corporations' charitable contributions,
they have left the courts in the predicament of either "doing too much" or
"doing too little" in adopting standards to resolve disputes over particular
contributions. In the face of this difficulty (consistent with accepted norms
of judicial power), the courts have elected the latter, safer course-with
certain important variations. While in the most recent charitable
contributions case, the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts applied the
traditional norms of corporate law adjudication-the business judgment
rule and the principle of fiduciary care-this approach is highly
problematic. Corporate charitable contributions cannot appropriately be
judged according to these traditional, commercially-oriented standards.
The same courts have also endorsed a loose standard of "reasonableness"
in reviewing corporate contributions, a standard given content by the
application of federal income tax principles. As discussed below, this
latter approach succeeds in taking account of the extra-commercial
character of corporate charitable contributions, but it also reflects the
conceptual limits of traditional corporate law.
The third section of the essay addresses problems of silence and
disclosure in the federal securities regulations. The point of departure is
the fact that there is no disclosure requirement pertaining to corporate
charitable contributions under state corporate law, the federal securities
regulations or any other system of law or regulation. The absence of such
a reporting requirement has compromised shareholders' property interests,
as well as other, nonpecuniary shareholder interests. Moreover, the
absence of a contributions disclosure requirement raises the larger question
5. See infra Part I.
6. See Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1.
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of what other information is missing from the universe of SEC-mandated
disclosure. In addition to charitable contributions, this unreported
information includes most data regarding corporate political contributions
and corporate conduct affecting employees, the environment, and product
safety. These gaps exist despite the fact that in Section 14(a) of the
Securities Act of 19347 (and in other provisions of the Securities Acts),8
Congress has given the SEC a mandate to promulgate rules "in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Thus, Congress has left the
SEC with substantial discretion to determine the scope of required
corporate disclosure, but while the SEC has exercised its authority to
require public corporations to disclose extensive financial and commercial
information, it has declined to require disclosure of information it
considers primarily of social significance rather than direct economic
significance to investors.
In addition, like the normative, political dimensions of the modern
corporate philanthropy laws, the normative, political dimensions of the
SEC's disclosure policies are not express in the securities regulations
themselves, and hence are not readily apparent. Indeed, in the rare
instance where the SEC has addressed the question of the proper
boundaries of required corporate disclosure, it has defended its reluctance
to expand the current disclosure mandates (and therefore shareholder
power in matters of corporate social policy) in terms of maintaining the
neutrality and objectivity of the Commission and of the investment process
generally. The final section of the essay criticizes the notion of neutrality
put forward by the SEC and argues that the Commission should expand
shareholders' ability to obtain information about corporate conduct
affecting matters of social policy. 9
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994); see generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994)) [hereinafter
the '34 Act]. The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
115 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994)) [hereinafter the '33 Act], and the '34 Act are referred
to collectively in the text as the "Securities Acts" or the "Securities Laws."
8. See '33 Act, §§ 7, 10(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77(c) (1994); '34 Act, §§ 10(b),
12(b)(1), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 781(b)(1), 78n(a) (1994).
9. Outside of the area of shareholder proposals, there has been relatively little
commentary on the normative dimensions of the SEC's rules. An exception is Jill E.
Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1129 (1993); see also Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62
CORNELL L. Rv. 50 (1976).
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I. LEGISLATIVE SILENCE AND THE ENLARGEMENT
OF MANAGERIAL POWER: THE MODERN PHILANTHROPY STATUTES
Each of the states has enacted a statutory provision authorizing
corporations to make charitable contributions. Most of the laws presently
in force are modeled on the corporate philanthropy provision first
proposed by a committee of the American Bar Association ("ABA") in
1948,10 and codified as Section 4(m) of the ABA's Model Business
Corporation Act of 1950.1" The Model Act's philanthropy provision was
a streamlined affirmation of corporate charitable authority. It provided,
in pertinent part, that "[e]ach corporation shall have power. . . [t]o make
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational
purposes.' 2 In fact, it was the uncompromising simplicity of the Model
Act's corporate philanthropy provision that made it, and still makes it-in
the various formulations adopted by the states-so revolutionary.
The radically simplified nature of the Model Act's philanthropy
provision-and, thus, the modern laws which represent its progeny-
becomes obvious when viewed in historical perspective. Prior to the
publication of the Model Act, several states had enacted statutory
provisions governing corporate charitable giving. These first generation
corporate philanthropy laws' 4 were largely a response to the uncertainty
10. Ray Garrett, who in 1948 was Chairman of the ABA's Committee on Business
Corporations (shortly thereafter renamed the Committee on Corporate Laws), was
instrumental in leading a movement for widespread liberalization of the states' corporate
philanthropy laws. He expressed his strong views on the merits of expanded corporate
charitable authority and increased corporate giving in his 1948 address to the Annual
Meeting of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Mercantile (subsequently "Business")
Law. See Ray Garrett, Corporate Donations to Charity, 4 Bus. LAW. 30 (1948)
(presenting the full text of the address). The members of this ABA subcommittee were
largely responsible for the first draft of the Model Business Corporation Act (which
included the unrestrictive philanthropy provision). The Model Act was completed in
1946, but first widely publicized in 1950.
11. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(m) (1971).
12. Id.
13. In his 1948 address to the ABA, Ray Garrett indicated that as of that date 15
states and the Territory of Hawaii had enacted some form of statutory authorization for
corporate charitable contributions. See Garrett, supra note 10, at 31.
14. In 1952, two years after the publication of the ABA's model philanthropy
provision, F. Emerson Andrews published the first comprehensive treatment of corporate
charitable giving. As part of his work, Andrews compiled a statutory appendix which set
forth the states' philanthropy provisions, as well as laws which had previously been
amended or repealed. See F. EMERSON ANDREWS, CORPORATION GIVING app. C (1952).
Andrews' Appendix C provides the basis of my statutory analysis of the early
philanthropy laws. For full citation to these earlier laws, the reader is directed to
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regarding corporate charitable authority; their most obvious function was
to codify this authority. The legal uncertainty regarding corporate power
to make charitable gifts in the absence of statutory authorization stemmed
from the notion of "defined," that is, circumscribed corporate powers,
referred to as the "ultra vires" doctrine. 5 The ultra vires doctrine strictly
limited corporate powers to those expressly sanctioned by law and,
consistent therewith, provided for in the corporation's charter. Thus, the
earliest, most fundamental problem of legal authority in the area of
corporate charitable giving was whether the institution itself, apart from
its agents, had the power to make charitable gifts. Silence in the early
corporate statutes led, uniquely, to a denial of corporate (and thus
managerial) authority to make charitable contributions.
While the early philanthropy laws were entirely permissive in certain
states," in most the laws went beyond resolving the general issue of the
corporate entity's authority vis a vis the state, and imposed a multiplicity
of substantive and procedural restrictions on corporate charitable giving.
In order to balance this expanded managerial authority with the protection
of shareholders' property interests, these prescriptive laws attempted to
delimit the precise nature of the charitable authority afforded corporate
boards. In particular, states frequently required board of director approval
of contributions,17 and two states expressly provided for shareholder
Andrews' work. The early philanthrophy laws are identified herein by state and by the
date of their enactment.
15. Until the early 1950s, the cases and commentaries on corporate charitable giving
focused almost exclusively on the ultra vires issue, which still figured prominently in the
landmark case of A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1953. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
For further discussion of the ultra vires issue in the context of corporate philanthropy, see
Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, at 594-95 nn.58-61.
16. The following states enacted unqualified philanthropy laws prior to the mid to
late 1940s: Illinois (1919, but confined to war-time donations); Michigan (1935); New
Mexico (1941); and Texas (1917). See ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 295, 299, 303, 314.
17. As of 1952 (two years after the initial publication of the Model Act and the year
of Corporation Giving's publication), of the 26 states which had enacted charitable
contributions provisions, 15 states expressly required that a company's board of directors
approve the gifts. These states included: Colorado, (1947); Indiana, (1949); Kansas,
(1951); Maryland, (1945); Massachusetts, (1933); Minnesota, (1949); New Jersey,
(1930); New York, (1931); North Carolina, (1945); Ohio, (1920); Oklahoma, (1949);
Pennsylvania, (1945); Tennessee, (1925); Virginia, (1945); and West Virginia, (1949).
See id. at 293-315. Delaware adopted the language of the Model Act, thus repealing the
requirement of board approval, in 1951. See id. at 294-95.
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approval. 8 In addition, certain states imposed quantitative limits on the
size of the gifts within the board's discretion;"9 geographic limits
pertaining to acceptable charitable beneficiaries;2" limits tying corporate
contributions to corporate "purposes" or "interests";2 and, in two
instances, express disclosure requirements.' In these more prescriptive
18. Hawaii's law (1947) required the approval of the holders of a majority of the
stock of the corporation to approve contributions. See id. at 316. Pennsylvania's law
(1945) provided for board control over contributions, unless otherwise specifically
provided "by resolution duly adopted by its shareholders." Id. at 311.
19. New Jersey's law, enacted in 1930 (and still in effect in 1952), provided as
follows:
When, however.... the expenditures for those purposes in any calendar
year shall in the aggregate amount to one per centum (1%) of the capital and
surplus as of the end of the preceding year, then before any further expenditure
is made during the year for those purposes by the corporation, ten days' notice
shall be given to the stockholders in the manner the directors or trustees direct,
of the intention to make the further expenditure, specifying the amount thereof,
and if written objections be made by the stockholders holding twenty-five per
centum (25%) or more of the stock of the corporation the further expenditure
shall not be made until it has been authorized at a stockholders' meeting.
Id. at 301. This law was repealed in 1968. Ohio's law, enacted in 1920 (and also still
in effect in 1952), included an analogous provision. See id. at 309. In 1918 New York
enacted a war-time contributions provision which included this type of quantitative limit.
See id. at 305-06. North Carolina's law, enacted in 1945, imposed an absolute upper
limit of five percent of net income on contributions (which were also subject to board
approval). See id. at 308-09.
20. Such geographic limits imposed a loose version of the common law benefit-to-
the-business requirement. Massachusetts' law (1933) provided for donations to charities
formed for the purpose of improving "social and economic conditions .. . in any
community in which such corporation is doing business." Id. at 298. New York's law
(1931) provided for contributions to charities operating "in any community or
communities in which such corporation is operating." Id. at 306.
21. New Jersey (1930), Ohio (1920), and Delaware (enacted 1941, repealed 1951).
See id. at 295, 301, 309. New York's laws had persistently included such a benefit-to-
the-business requirement. In 1952, New York's laws provided for contributions as "may
be beneficial to the business activities of the corporation or the well being of its
employees." Id. at 304.
22. In 1950 New York amended its philanthropy law to add the following
requirement:
A domestic corporation which submits an annual report to its
stockholders and which, pursuant to the authority of this section, appropriates,
spends or contributes a sum or sums aggregating in excess of five hundred
dollars to or on behalf of any one donee, during the period covered by such
report, shall include in such report the identity of each such donee together
with the total amount appropriated, spent or contributed to it or on its behalf
during such period. If such corporation does not submit such an annual report
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formulations, the problem of legal authority was transmuted from the issue
of institutional constraints to one addressing the authority of the corporate
agent (the board of directors) vis a vis the principal (the shareholders).
Beginning in 1948, outspoken members of the American Bar
Association's Committee on Business Corporations,' in conjunction with
various community chests and other nonprofit leaders, 24 campaigned
vigorously in favor of the widespread adoption of unrestrictive
philanthropy provisions by the state legislatures. The Committee "sent to
all secretaries of state and state bar association presidents a memorandum
embodying its opinion that corporate giving had the general approval of
management and stockholders and that it should be expressly authorized
by statute. " ' Whether or not stockholders (as opposed to corporate
to its stockholders it shall send to each one a statement of the total amount of
all such appropriations, expenditures and contributions made during each fiscal
year and any stockholder, upon written request, shall be entitled to an itemized
list of such donees and amounts. The corporation need not comply with such
a request regarding any year more than five years prior to that in which such
request is made.
Id. at 307. The disclosure requirement was repealed the following year.
Beginning in 1920, Ohio's law provided that all corporations making charitable
contributions "report annually to the Secretary of State the sums so appropriated or
expended and the name or names of the community funds or philanthropic, charitable or
benevolent instrumentalities in whose behalf such sums were appropriated or expended."
Id. at 310. Ohio's disclosure requirement was repealed in 1927. See id.
23. In addition to Ray Garrett-Chairman of the ABA Committee which produced
the 1950 Model Business Corporation Act, author of the Model Act's preface and of the
1948 "call to arms" exhorting liberalization of the states' philanthropy laws (see Garrett,
supra note 10)-another outspoken member of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws
was Prof. E. Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School. Along with Garrett, Dodd was also
involved in drafting the first Model Business Corporation Act. See Preface to 1950
Revision of Model Business Corporation Act Prepared by the Committee on Corporate
Laws, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association, in Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws,
Interim Report to 1957 Session of New York State Legislature, app. H [hereinafter 1957
Interim Report] (listing Dodd as one of the authors). Dodd's favorable view of corporate
social spending was made famous in a series of essays he exchanged with Prof. Adolf A.
Berle. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932); see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement
of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194
(1934-1935).
24. The involvement of community nonprofit leaders in this effort is described,
though cursorily, in ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 234-35; see also Burt S. Prunty, Jr.,
Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. Rav. 467, 470-71 (1960).
25. Miguel A. de Capriles & Ray Garrett Jr., Legality of Corporate Support to
Education: A Survey of Current Developments, 38 A.B.A. J. 209, 211 (1952).
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managers, nonprofit leaders, and lawyers' organizations26) actually
endorsed expanded corporate giving, this activism on the part of the bar, 27
including the unrestrictive philanthropy provision incorporated in the
Model Business Corporation Act, proved highly influential with the
legislatures.
From the late 1940s and early 1950s onward, the states codified the
death of the common law benefit requirement,28 and, at the same time,
effectuated the comprehensive deregulation of the law of corporate
charitable giving. Section 122(9) of Delaware's General Corporation Law,
which was enacted (in substance) in 1951, precisely mirrors the sparse
terms of the Model Act. It currently provides, simply, that "Every
corporation .. shall have power to. . . [m]ake donations for the public
"29welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes .... .
Section 202(a)(12) of New York's Business Corporation Law, enacted in
1961, provides under the heading "General Powers," that "[e]ach
corporation . . . shall have power . . . [t]o make donations, irrespective
of corporate benefit, for the public welfare or for community fund,
hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes...
."30 The philanthropy provisions in the other forty-eight states vary in
26. While the ABA Committee's memorandum to the secretaries of state expressed
"its opinion" that increased giving enjoyed stockholder approval, there is no evidence of
data supporting its conclusion.
27. For example, in February 1957, in its reponse to a questionnaire distributed by
the Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws, the New York
City Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Law expressed its displeasure with New
York's prescriptive philanthropy provision. See 1957 Interim Report, supra note 23, at
app. G (containing the questionnaire and the City Bar's response). In its Second Interim
Report, the Joint Legislative Committee noted that "fin the opinion of some
organizations, the present New York law is too restrictive . . . ." Joint Legislative
Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws, Second Interim Report to 1958
Session of New York State Legislature, app. A at 48 (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1958
Interim Report].
28. The lingering influence of the common law benefit-to-the business requirement,
and its chilling effect on increased national giving in support of higher education, is
described by de Capfiles and Garrett in an essay in the ABA's Journal, published in 1952.
These lawyers exhorted their colleagues to consider the "professional importance" of
reviewing the "legal obstructions to this highly desirable development" of increased
corporate support of higher education. See de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 25, at 210.
They argued that "the solution, of course, should come through statutes." Id. at 211.
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1993).
30. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1994) (emphasis added).
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only minor detail from those of New York and Delaware quoted above.3'
Nearly without exception, terms mandating the proper size, objectives, and
decisional processes appropriate to corporate charitable contributions have
31. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have provisions which are
nearly identical to Delaware's. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas (except requires board approval of charitable contributions), Connecticut,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland (except requires board approval of
charitable contributions), Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas and West Virginia. See
ALA. CODE § 10-2B-3.02(13) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.010(13) (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-004(A)(13) (repealed 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-25-103
(Michie 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-291(d) (West 1987); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 415-4(13) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-4(m) (1996); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/3.10(m) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(9) (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:41(12) (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & Ass'NS § 2-103(13)(ii) (1993);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.149) (West 1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.385(12), (15) (West
1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2004(13) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.070(6) (1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4(M) (Michie 1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(D)
(Anderson 1992 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 1016(9) (West 1987); 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1502 (9) (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4(13) (1992);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-2-58(13) (Michie 1991); TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr art.
2.02(A)(14) (1997); W.VA. CODE § 31-1-8(m) (1996). In addition to New York, six
other states' philanthropy laws include language which expressly repeals the benefit
requirement. These states are California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey
(except requires board approval of contributions) and North Dakota. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 207(e) (West 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 202.1(G() (West 1981);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 9(k) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302.A.161(11) (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4(1) (West 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-19.1-26(11) (1995). In 19 other states, there are two donations provisions,
one governing donations benefitting the business (e.g., political contributions), while the
other provides for donations for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, etc. The
states following this pattern include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See COLO.
REv. STAT. § 7-103-102(m), (n) (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0302(12), (14)
(West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-302(13), (16) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-
2(13), (15) (Michie 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.302(13), (15) (West 1991); Ky. REV.
STAt. ANN. § 271B.3-020(m), (o) (Michie 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-3.02(13),
(15) (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-115(13), (15) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 293-A:3.02(13), (15) (Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §155-3-02(13), (15) (1996); OR.
REv. STAT. § 60.077(2)(n), (p) (1995); S.C. CODe ANN. § 33-3-102(13), (15) (Law. Co-
op. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-13-102(13), (14) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-
lOa-302(13), (15) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 3.02 (13), (15) (1997); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-627(12), (13) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.03.020(2)(o),
(q) (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0302(13), (15) (West 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-16-302(a)(xiii), (xv) (Michie 1997).
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been omitted in favor of unqualified grants of corporate charitable
authority.
The significance of the open-ended modem philanthropy laws is
fundamentally related to the issue of managerial authority-since donating
someone else's money to charity is fundamentally different from making
a charitable donation of one's own funds. The grant of donative power to
corporate managers is remarkable precisely because the modem corporate
philanthropy laws allow corporate contributions to be made without regard
to the firm's commercial objectives. By virtue of these laws, corporate
managers are freed from the necessity of adhering to commercial
objectives in the allocation of the firm's charitable funds, and are thus
empowered to pursue whatever philanthropic objectives meet their fancy.
In affording corporate managers this unique form of discretion, the modem
philanthropy laws depart from the fundamental, unifying principle within
corporate law: wealth-creation in the interest of corporate shareholders.
The modem philanthropy laws, therefore, pose a fundamental problem
with respect to corporate "agency costs. "32
In establishing room for a redistributive dimension within corporate
law, the modern corporate philanthropy laws are sui generis, and their
presence within the states' modem corporate laws is puzzling. Nowhere
else in the states' corporate laws are corporate managers afforded authority
to depart from commercial, profit-motivated objectives in the allocation of
corporate resources.33 The disjunction between the unrestrictive corporate
philanthropy laws and the larger framework of state corporate law suggests
that the state legislatures validated corporate charitable authority without
reconciling it with the broader principles and objectives of corporate law.
Indeed, it is easy to imagine the state legislators as being relatively naive
or passive-and thus less than ideally "responsible"-in enacting the
modem philanthropy laws proposed by the ABA. Perhaps the generally
"enabling" nature of state corporate law, in conjunction with the
persuasive authority of the ABA, served to obscure, even from those who
32. It is important to note that while the benefits accruing to corporate managers as
a result of these gifts do not reduce the value of the philanthropy to the recipients, the
donations themselves-which might not be made in the absence of such correlative,
managerial benefits-do impose costs on the corporation and hence the stockholders. See
Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, at Part III. For the seminal analysis of
agency costs in the economics literature, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). This work has been extraordinarily influential in focusing
corporate legal scholars on the agency cost problem affecting public corporations.
33. For a comparison of the corporate philanthropy laws and the "constituency"
statutes widely enacted by the states (but not by Delaware) in the 1980's, see Kahn,
Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, nn.213-15 and accompanying text.
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enacted them, the full significance of "enabling" corporate philanthropy
laws.34
In fact, there is evidence of precisely this kind of "laissez-faire" in the
legislative record surrounding New York's adoption of an unqualified
philanthropy provision in 1961. In its 1958 Interim Report, the Joint
Legislative Committee appointed to study the revision of the State's
corporate laws noted that:
In the opinion of some organizations, the present New York
Law is too restrictive-the corporation statute should enunciate a
simple corporate power, leaving the limitations to be imposed by
the tax laws,35 the penal laws, 6 and court decisions relating to the
reasonableness of action by corporate directors and officers.37
Such a policy is embodied in the Model Act provision on the
subject.38
Thus, in deciding to incorporate in its comprehensive revision of New
York's corporate laws an unrestrictive philanthropy provision similar to
the Model Act's, the State legislature appears to have followed the
"recommendation" of the Joint Committee: It officially decided not to
decide, as a matter of corporate law, what limits and requirements should
govern corporate contributions.
In light of the difficulty or impossibility of retrieving pertinent
legislative history from the states, the motives and objectives surrounding
the adoption of the modern philanthropy laws remain unclear. Perhaps the
legislators believed that the public interest would best be served by
increased corporate charitable giving. But it is equally plausible that they
were more calculating and focused on their own interests; that is, the
expectation that increased corporate social spending might forestall
34. As I have argued elsewhere, the flexibility otherwise present in the state
corporation codes is intended to serve the interests of corporate profit-maximization;
whereas the flexibility in the philanthropy laws frees corporate managers from the
necessity of observing this otherwise universal norm. See Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy,
supra note 1, at 602-05.
35. It is the Federal Income Tax Code, rather than the states' laws governing
taxation, which have been critically important in the development of law and practice in
this area. See infra Part II; see also Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving:
Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation and the Social Construction of Charity,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994).
36. It is difficult to understand which, if any, penal laws would be relevant.
37. For the problem of applying the existing case law concerning "the reasonableness
of action by corporate directors and officers," see infra Part II.
38. 1958 Interim Report, supra note 27, app. A, at 48.
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increased taxation and, therefore, increased anti-government sentiment.
As for the intentions of the ABA in encouraging the deregulation of
corporate giving, its reform campaign has served the philanthropic
predilections of corporate managers, as well as those nonprofit leaders and
organizations and segments of the public that have benefited from
increased corporate social spending.39 Nevertheless, it is apparent that for
both the ABA and the state legislatures, concerns over shareholders'
interests were secondary, at best, since there is no evidence that actual
stockholder preferences were taken into consideration, either by the ABA
or the state legislatures, and, furthermore, neither the ABA's model law,
nor the laws enacted by the states have provided shareholders a right to
affect corporate decision-making in regard to contributions.
Indeed, the manner in which these laws have operated to confer
decisional authority over charitable contributions on corporate officers and
boards of directors merits further scrutiny. Again, the states' current
philanthropy provisions are entirely silent on this question of decisional
authority. The grant of decisional authority to corporate management has
arisen by implication (and has been respected by the courts) as a result of
this silence in the modem laws. Since they do not expressly provide, as
Ray Garrett had suggested in 1948, that corporations have charitable
authority to make such gifts "as the board of directors may deem
proper,"4° this corporate governance question-that is, who shall have
decisional authority over corporate contributions-is resolvable only by
reference to other provisions in the states' corporation codes and the
principles embodied in the corporate law cases and commentaries.4'
In regard to other provisions in the states' corporation codes, nearly
every state has enacted a provision substantially analogous to Delaware's
39. For data concerning the allocation of corporate donations among various kinds
of charitable organizations (e.g., educational groups, health and community services and
arts organizations), see GIVING USA 1997, supra note 2, at 98. Education has
traditionally been the highest recipient of corporate funds. Nevertheless, the range of
organizations qualifying as "educational" is notoriously broad, and the policy implications
of "educational" giving differ depending on whether the recipient is, for example, the
CEO's alma mater, a public school in an economically disadvantaged community, or a
public policy institute qualified as a nonprofit, educational organization. (For a discussion
of technically philanthropic corporate donations to politicized public policy organizations,
see Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, at Part V.).
40. Garrett, supra note 10, at 33.
41. Although the philanthropy laws are silent on the matter of decisional authority,
the legislators enacting the laws, and certainly the lawyers serving on the Joint Legislative
Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws, should have been aware of the fact
that silence on the matter of charitable decision-making authority would result in this
power accruing to corporate directors and officers, consistent with the status quo within
corporation law. See generally supra note 23.
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section 141, which provides that "The business and affairs of every
corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors ... ."42 The relevant question is, therefore, whether these
general affirmations of directors' power over corporate business and affairs
should govern philanthropic decision-making. Where the charitable
contributions have a nexus to enhancing the firm's profits,43 the principles
otherwise validating centralized corporate decision-making logically seem
to apply. (However, such profit-motivated donations would not properly
be eligible for the charitable deduction under § 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code.)44 Alternatively, in regard to philanthropically motivated
corporate contributions (ordinarily deductible as charitable contributions
under § 170), the argument for board of director control-and against
shareholder voice-is a weak one.
Interestingly, there are no cases in which the issue of managerial
control over corporate charitable contributions has expressly been litigated.
While litigants have challenged the propriety of the amount or purpose of
particular gifts, they have never directly challenged the justification for
managerial control over corporate charitable contributions. The issue may
be too theoretic, and insufficiently lucrative, to be the subject of ordinary,
commercial litigation. Alternatively, the status quo, that is the prevailing
framework of centralized board of director control, may be so widely
accepted by attorneys, litigants, judges and commentators that it appears
beyond challenge, even in this area. But if the latter assumption has
prevailed, it has rested on a misapprehension. Centralized corporate
decision-making has been justified on the basis of efficiency concerns (that
is, the maximization of corporate, shareholder and, consequently, "social
wealth") 45 and managerial expertise in commercial affairs. But
philanthropically motivated charitable contributions cannot, by definition,
be rationalized on the basis of corporate profit maximization, and there is
no reason to believe that managerial expertise in commercial affairs carries
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). See also, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §
300(a) (West 1997); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/5 (West 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:12B-62 (West 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. Law § 701 (McKinney 1986); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1721 (West 1995).
43. For a discussion of the curious notion of "profit maximizing" charitable
contributions, see Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, at Part VI.
44. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1994).
45. For a discussion of the concept of efficiency, see Symposium on Efficiency as
a Legal Concern, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 485 (1980); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 124, 125 n.2 (1994) ("Indeed the ultimate defense of the shareholder wealth
criterion must be cast in social wealth terms.").
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with it greater expertise in regard to the allocation of social and cultural
resources.
Thus, the fact that the board of directors has been accepted as the
appropriate locus of decision-making authority in regard to corporate
charitable contributions is based neither on express legislation (that is,
majoritarian consensus), nor on principles of efficiency or managerial
expertise. Furthermore, although corporate commentators frequently
justify corporate law rules on the basis that they reflect the bargain which
would otherwise voluntarily be struck by informed participants in a world
without transaction costs, 46 the status quo in regard to corporate charitable
giving fails to fit this model. The absence of systematic disclosure of
corporate charitable contributions undercuts notions of consent, and hence
metaphors of contract, as they apply to the relationship of corporation and
shareholder in this context. Furthermore, it is simply not credible that
shareholders would willingly confer unqualified charitable authority over
corporate resources on corporate management. (Ask yourself the
conditions under which you would give someone else unqualified
charitable authority over your assets.) Thus, neither the principles of
majoritarian consensus, wealth-producing efficiency, commercial expertise
or freedom of contract support the current allocation of philanthropic
decision-making authority in favor of corporate management.
Rather, corporate managers have inherited corporate charitable
authority because the corporate philanthropy statutes (that is, the
legislatures) did not expressly allocate decisional authority to corporate
shareholders, because shareholders have never forced either the legislatures
or the courts to reexamine this aspect of the corporate status quo, and
because corporate charitable giving has unreflectively been lumped
together with the rest of corporate "business and affairs." Thus, the
legislatures have used the philanthropy provisions' silence on the matter
of philanthropic decisional authority to stimulate increased corporate giving
and to enlarge the power of corporate officers and directors in this area;
46. I am referring to the school of thought in which corporate law is conceived of
as an outgrowth of contract law, that is, as a system of private ordering. See William H.
Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation Doctrine, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, 387-
409 (David Kairys ed., 1990). This view is reflected most recently in the "nexus of
contracts" school of corporate legal theory. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549 (1989); Symposium on
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989). For important
critiques of the nexus of contracts model of the corporation, see William W. Bratton Jr.,
The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407
(1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985); Cox, supra note 4; Alan Wolfe, The Modern
Corporation: Private Agent or Public A ctor? 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1673 (1993).
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and they have avoided controversy in so doing by not appearing obviously
or directly responsible for allocating corporate power in this fashion.
In sum, while the modem laws appear unremarkable on their face,
upon reflection it is apparent that the authority which they create is highly
controversial. While corporate commentators speak of the "economic"
nature of corporate law, the modem philanthropy laws are fundamentally
political in nature, as they provide authority for reallocating capital from
corporations and shareholders to nonprofit organizations, and place this
authority beyond the hands of corporate shareholders. These laws are not
the product of market evolution, nor can they be defended on the basis of
"efficiency," as traditionally understood. Rather than simulating
bargained-for terms, the philanthropy laws reflect the preferences of
particular powerful persons and professional organizations at a definite
point in time. Ultimately it is unclear whether inertia, relative ignorance
among shareholders and the public, or some unarticulated consensus about
corporate charitable giving keeps the modem philanthropy laws in force
and keeps power over giving in the hands of corporate management.
II. THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY STANDARDS
FOR CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS:
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE LAW
The absence of objective standards in the modem corporate
philanthropy laws has also presented the courts with a dilemma. In light
of the state legislatures' decision to sanction truly philanthropic corporate
contributions and to avoid imposing objective limits or requirements on
such contributions, by what standards should the courts adjudicate the
propriety of particular contributions? In those instances where a statute is
relevant, the legal system prescribes that courts confine themselves to
applying the existing statutory standards or to otherwise fulfilling the will
of the legislature. But while the modem philanthropy laws expressly
validate corporate charitable authority, they supply no particular, objective
terms for courts to apply in resolving shareholder challenges to corporate
contributions. The legislatures have therefore left the courts in the
predicament of weighing the dangers of doing "too little" (since a system
of unlimited charitable contributions by business corporations would be
untenable, despite the absence of statutory limits) against the dangers of
doing "too much" (by crafting significant limiting criteria where the
legislatures have repealed them) and thereby exceeding the proper scope
of judicial authority.
Although the absence of explicit, statutory standards in the corporate
charitable contributions area raises difficult questions, in the larger context
of corporate law it is rarely the case that corporate managers' acts and
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decisions are governed by express, statutory standards.47 Instead, the most
important corporate law standards governing directors' and officers' acts
and decisions are the fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty which have
been elaborated through the common law. 48 These fiduciary standards-
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty-exhort managers to be
conscientious and unconflicted by personal, self-interested motivations in
their administration of corporate affairs.
Moreover, these substantive standards of fiduciary obligation have
been recast in the litigation context as the "business judgment rule. , 49 The
business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company."5 The rule, which incorporates a management-friendly
bias into the law, has been justified on several grounds, including the need
to encourage competent individuals to serve on corporate boards; the
desire to stimulate wealth-producing risk-taking on the part of corporate
management; and the belief that the professional class of corporate
managers should not ordinarily be second-guessed either by judges or by
shareholders (who both, presumptively, have less competence to administer
the corporation's affairs).
Thus, in the established pattern of corporate law adjudication,
plaintiffs are allowed to overcome the business judgment rule and
challenge corporate managers' acts and decisions "on the merits" only if
47. The essentially permissive flavor of state corporation law is captured in the
widespread description of the corporation codes as enabling statutes. For discussion of
corporate law's mix of mandatory and "optional" rules, see Bernard S. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542
(1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Lav: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989); Gordon, supra note 46.
48. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that
copartners owe one another a fiduciary duty of "finest loyalty"); Bayer v. Beran, 49
N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (asserting that the "business judgment rule," while
discouraging interference with corporate directors' independence, must yield to individual
fiduciary loyalty); see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (holding that
the common law rules governing good faith and fiduciary responsibility apply in the
context of bankruptcy claims).
49. For commentary on the business judgment rule, and its application, see DENNIS
J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS (3d ed. 1991); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule:
Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 287 (1994); Bayless
Manning, Symposium: Current Issues in Corporate Governance: The Business Judgment
Rule in Overview, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (1984).
50. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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they can present facts indicating either gross negligence"1 or a conflict of
interest02 on the part of the corporate officials. Where a plaintiff succeeds
in making a showing of one of the former "defects," the business
judgment rule will no longer apply and the court will require the
defendants to demonstrate the "inherent fairness" to the corporation and
its shareholders of their acts and decisions. 3 Thus, the standards of
fiduciary care and loyalty and the business judgment rule form the bedrock
principles of adjudication in the area of corporation law.
One might assume that the aforementioned fiduciary standards and the
business judgment rule would govern shareholder challenges to corporate
contributions-in light of the absence of express statutory standards for
corporate contributions and the pervasive application of these standards in
the corporate case law. In fact, this assumption is evident in the 1958
Interim Report of the Joint Legislative Committee (set forth in full
above). 4 The Report suggested that the courts could respond to the
absence of standards in the unqualified corporate philanthropy laws by
applying (the usual) court decisions relating to the reasonableness of action
by corporate directors and officers.5 ' But this is far more problematic than
the Joint Committee's Report suggested. There is a fundamental
disjunction between the assumptions underlying the business judgment rule
and directors' fiduciary obligations, on the one hand, and corporate
charitable giving, on the other. The existing standards of fiduciary care
and loyalty and the business judgment rule cannot appropriately be
applied, at least as they have traditionally been defined in the corporate
case law, to the review of management's decisions regarding charitable
contributions. The courts have thus had to grapple both with the absence
of express statutory standards and the essential ill-fit of the traditional
common law standards to the corporate charitable contributions area.
Perhaps as a result of the relative absence of public information
regarding individual corporations' charitable contributions, or because of
the lax standards applied in the review of contributions (as described more
fully below), there are only two cases where shareholders have challenged
corporate contributions under the modern, unrestrictive corporate
51. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
52. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
53. See Weinburger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701, 703, 710 (Del. 1983); Fliegler,
361 A.2d at 221; Globe Woolen v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918);
(reflecting examples of the application of the "inherent fairness" test).
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
55. See id.
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philanthropy laws. 6 Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,7 decided by
the Delaware Chancery Court in 1969, established that a valid corporate
charitable gift "must merely be within reasonable limits both as to amount
and purpose. "- In contrast, it is the facts in Kahn v. Sullivan5 9-decided
by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1991-which leave an almost indelible
impression. Kahn v. Sullivan is the only case in which the size of the gift
in question-$85 million-attained the proportions possible for a major
contributing public corporation;' and it is, in fact, the only litigation
involving a shareholder challenge to a corporate contribution by a public
61corporation.
The far more modest contribution in Theodora involved a transfer of
company stock valued at $550,000 to a foundation established by the
company's controlling shareholder-director. Notably, the chancery court
made no attempt to resolve the dispute over the gift by applying traditional
fiduciary norms of care and loyalty. Furthermore, while the court adopted
a posture of extreme deference to the philanthropic decisions of the
controlling shareholder-director, it did not attempt to justify this deference
in terms of the business judgment rule. Rather than adhering to these
accepted patterns of corporate law adjudication, the court first described
contemporary social and economic developments favoring increased
corporate philanthropy, and then invoked a decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court it interpreted as holding "that a corporate charitable or
educational gift to be valid must merely be within reasonable limits both
as to amount and purpose." 62 Thus, in Theodora, "reasonableness in
amount and purpose" was held to be the dispositive standard for judging
the propriety of a corporation's charitable contributions, and the court
56. The language of the philanthropy laws may itself have played a part in
discouraging shareholder suits, since the laws appear to sanction any and all charitable
contributions.
57. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
58. Id. at 404.
59. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
60. There are two opinions in the case. The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed and
approved the chancery court's approval of a proposed settlement of one of the shareholder
suits challenging Occidental's proposed charitable contribution. See id.; see also Sullivan
v. Hammer, [1990 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 95,415, at 97,061 (Del. Ch.
1990).
61. The absence of shareholder challenges to gifts by public corporations is more
remarkable for the fact that publicly held firms are responsible for the vast majority of
the total corporate charitable contributions made annually. See AUDRIs TILLMAN,
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1995, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, 1996.
62. Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 404; see also A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
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upheld the challenged gift as reasonable in both respects.63 Theodora is
noteworthy as the first deliberate attempt to give substantive content to the
notion of "reasonable" charitable corporate contributions, and the contours
of "reasonableness" are examined fully below.64
Theodora is also significant for the fact that the court did not apply the
business judgment rule in its review of the contribution. As described
above, the business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company ."65 As the court appears to have recognized,
because philanthropically motivated corporate contributions do not involve
business judgments, the business judgment rule presumption is
fundamentally unsuited to their review-just as principles of efficiency,
expertise and wealth creation are generally inapposite in this context. The
fact that the court also declined to apply a duty of loyalty analysis in
reviewing the plaintiff's claim-notwithstanding that circumstances
surrounding the company's contribution raised the issue of self-interest on
the part of the controlling shareholder-director 66-is also significant. The
standard of self-interest applied by the courts in reviewing corporate
management's conduct has not traditionally encompassed the kind of
nonpecuniary personal and professional benefits and indirect pecuniary
benefits accruing to managers as a result of their control over corporate
contributions.67
63. See Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 405.
64. The concept of "reasonable donations" floated through the early statutes and case
law, but had never been given any distinct meaning. The following states had "pre-
modem" philanthropy laws which authorized "reasonable" contributions: Maryland
(1945); Massachusetts (1933); New Jersey (1930); and New York (1923). See ANDREWS,
supra note 14, at 297-98, 301-02, 306.
65. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (emphasis added).
66. Mr. Henderson, who, as the court recognized, effectively controlled the affairs
of the corporation, established the foundation which received and dispursed the gift,
determined the ultimate beneficiary of the gift, and also maintained a private residence
(at an apparently below market rate) at the site of the camp which was the beneficiary of
the gift. See Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d at 402.
67. Self-interest on the part of corporate directors and officers has been analyzed in
depth in the corporate case law in a number of paradigmatic contexts, most particularly
unsolicited takeover attempts, executive compensation, self-dealing transactions, and
corporate opportunity cases. Aside from the takeover cases, which consider the general
motive of entrenchment in office, the issue has always been the potential divergence
between the pecuniary interests of the insider and that of the corporation and the
shareholders. For a fuller analysis of the problem of managerial self-interest in regard
to corporate contributions, see Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, at Part III.
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The contribution at issue in the Kahn v. Sullivan litigation was an $85
million gift by Occidental Petroleum Corporation to construct and fund the
Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center. 68 The museum project
had been initiated by Dr. Hammer himself, the founder and Chairman of
the Board of Occidental. In order to neutralize Dr. Hammer's obvious
self-interest in having Occidental fund the museum, the company
established a Special Committee of outside directors to determine whether
the company would go forward with the proposal.6 9 Both the chancery
court and the supreme court (both courts were reviewing a proposed
settlement to one of the shareholder suits over the gift) determined that the
business judgment rule would likely be applied if the case were tried on
the merits. Both courts decided that this fact severely limited the
plaintiffs' chances of ultimately prevailing in their claims.
The Kahn decisions contrast sharply with the opinion in Theodora.
Where Theodora departed from the business judgment rule analysis, both
courts in Kahn emphasized the importance of the business judgment rule
issue in reviewing the propriety of the charitable gift. The chancery court
concluded that the business judgment rule represented "an almost
impenetrable barrier to the plaintiffs." Yet in deciding that the business
judgment rule would be applied, and would insulate the Committee's
decision, both the chancery court and the supreme court apparently failed
to register the extraordinary nature of the decision confronting the
Committee-the approval of an $85 million charitable contribution in the
name of the company's Chairman.
The chancery court's insensitivity to the extraordinary, extra-
commercial corporate conduct in question is apparent in several respects.
First, most obviously, the court never addressed whether the business
judgment rule should apply to the review of a corporate charitable
68. The facts surrounding the museum proposal, Dr. Hammer's role in initiating the
proposal, and the actions of the Special Committee of the board of directors are described
at length in the supreme court's opinion. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 52-56
(Del. 1991).
69. The term "outside director" is used within corporate legal analysis to distinguish
directors who are also officers (or otherwise formally employed by the corporation), from
directors who have no other such affiliation with the firm. The notion is that outside
directors will add greater objectivity to the deliberation of the board. Academic
commentators and institutional investors have extensively addressed the proper
composition of the corporate board of directors. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 3A.01 (Am. Law Inst. 1994); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler,
Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporate Law: The ALI's Project and the Independent
Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 863 (1991); see also, Adam Bryant, The Search for the Perfect Corporate Board,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, § 3 (Business), at 1.
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contribution, notwithstanding that it regarded the business judgment rule
issue as nearly dispositive. And while the chancery court described certain
factors which, if present, would mandate that the presumption be
overturned, the factors-such as the defendants' expectation of deriving a
"personal financial benefit, "70 or a decision "so irrational that it could not
have been the reasonable exercise of the business judgment of the
board" 7 -are inapposite in the charitable contributions context. Indeed,
on this rationale, the business judgment rule would always apply to
management's charitable contributions decisions, and would thus act "as
an almost impenetrable barrier" to any and all shareholder suits over
corporate contributions.72
The language used by the chancery court to describe Occidental's gift
is also revealing. The court most frequently referred to the contribution
as the "proposal for funding the museum,"'73 or the "transaction" 74-terms
which ordinarily apply to commercial dealings and which are largely
nondescriptive of Occidental's proposed charitable contribution. Finally,
the court described two other judgments by boards of directors where the
business judgment rule was applied-a rejection of a tender offer and a
decision to repurchase a "dissident" director's stock-to further support its
conclusion that the business judgment rule would be applied to the
Committee's approval of the gift.75 But rather than supporting its
reasoning, the court's analogy actually undercut its conclusion that the
business judgment rule would apply to the Committee's approval of the
gift, since both comparisons involve commercial transactions
fundamentally dissimilar to the charitable contribution in question.76
The supreme court's analysis of the business judgment rule issue
reflects similar shortcomings. The court focused on the "independence"
of the Committee's members, which it analyzed in terms of the absence of
their receipt of a direct, pecuniary gain from approving the gift, the
absence of specific facts demonstrating they were dominated by Dr.
70. Sullivan v. Hammer, [1990 Decisions] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) § 95,415, at
97,061, 97,064 (Del. Ch. 1990) (emphasis added).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. Perhaps this universal application of the business judgment rule is the
intended result. In this manner the courts could secure the social benefits arising from
corporate giving and remove it from shareholder scrutiny-much as the legislatures have
done-without drawing attention to their decisions.
73. See id. at 97,062.
74. See id. at 97,064.
75. See id. at 97,065; see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d. 1140 (Del. 1990); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
76. See Sullivan, [1990 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,065.
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Hammer, and their consultation with independent legal counsel." In sum,
the supreme court focused entirely on the issue of Committee process in
its business judgment rule analysis, while ignoring the relevance of the
charitable nature of the Committee's decision.
In addition to the business judgment rule question, both courts
considered the plaintiffs' claim of breach of due care. Yet this aspect of
the decisions appears even more perfunctory. The chancery court merely
stated that "[t]he record also shows that the directors and the Special
Committee gave due consideration to the transaction."78 And the supreme
court merely restated the chancery court's conclusion and described it as
"the product of an orderly and logical deductive process ... supported by
the record. "79 Again, a myopic focus on the procedural aspects of the
Committee's conduct supplanted a thorough analysis by these courts of
what, precisely, due care would mean in the Committee's approval of the
charitable contribution.
These weaknesses in the Kahn decisions reflect the fact that the
business judgment rule and the duty of care are essentially extraneous to
the issue of the propriety of a corporation's charitable contributions.
Indeed after concluding this aspect of their analysis, both courts entirely
changed their focus. They proceeded to analyze Occidental's gift in
relation to Delaware's unrestrictive philanthropy law and the objective,
tax-based standards of reasonableness which had been endorsed in
Theodora. Based on their interpretation of the business judgment rule and
the lax standard of reasonableness, both courts finally concluded that the
plaintiffs had almost no chance of succeeding on the merits, and they
approved the proposed settlement.
In conclusion, although the courts in Kahn applied the business
judgment rule analysis and invoked the duty of care, these standards have
little meaning in regard to charitable contributions, and to the extent that
they are invoked, they serve unjustifiably to extend the prevailing
managerial bias within corporation law to the charitable contributions area.
Philanthropically motivated business contributions do not involve a
business judgment which should be protected by the business judgment
rule. In addition, although the obligation of due care seems essentially
concerned with deliberation or "process," by necessity it involves some
underlying notion of what the relevant actors should be diligent
about-which, in corporate law, has always meant the maximization of
corporate wealth. However, because wealth maximization need not be a
consideration in a company's contributions, and because the judicial
standards for "reasonable" contributions are so lax (as discussed more
77. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 60 (Del. 1991).
78. Sullivan, [1990 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,065.
79. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61.
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amply below), there is little in the administration of a company's charitable
contributions about which corporate managers must be diligent.
In addition, as mentioned above, the duty of loyalty cannot be readily
adapted to this context, since managerial self-interest in corporate law has
traditionally been defined in terms of direct pecuniary gain, and has not
encompassed the nonmonetary or less quantifiable benefits accruing to
managers as a result of their control over corporate charitable
contributions.8" Finally, even the standard of inherent fairness, which is
applied when a court determines that managerial self-interest is present, is
inapposite as traditionally interpreted. "Fairness" in corporate law (like
"self-interest") has been defined exclusively in terms of narrow, monetized
concepts applicable to commercial transactions.8' Since corporate
charitable contributions are not bilateral, mutually self-enhancing
exchanges, a norm of fairness based on a notion of bargaining or market-
based exchange cannot address the deeper philosophical, political and
social issues posed by such contributions.82
Of course, courts could address the issue of fairness more directly,
outside of the established confines of corporate law adjudication, and
require corporations (that is, directors and officers in charge of charitable
contributions decisions) to justify their charitable contributions according
to broader norms of "fairness." This would have far-reaching practical
and legal implications, however. Most obviously, it would severely chill
the practice of corporate charitable giving, since-and this is the heart of
the problem-there is no established consensus of when philanthropic
contributions by business corporations are "fair" to the corporation and its
shareholders.83
Finally, to conclude the analysis of the case law, the lack of fit
between the traditional standards of corporate law adjudication and
corporate charitable contributions explains the Delaware courts' fabrication
of the "reasonableness" standard. Indeed, it is this question of
"reasonable" versus "wasteful" charitable contributions which is ultimately
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81. For discussion of the limited nature of the fairness analysis in corporation law
see, for example, Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DuKE
L.J. 425 (1993).
82. For an interesting critique of the current hegemony of markets, see ROBERT
KuTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE (1997).
83. An effort to formulate a relevant, authentic theory of fairness to support
corporate charitable contributions might involve an inquiry into moral philosophy,
organizational theory or sociology (and perhaps even evolutionary theory), as well as
theories of democratic organization. That is, such a theory of fairness would have to be
constructed from principles and ideas largely foreign to corporate law and even
mainstream corporate theory.
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the relevant and more trenchant one. In giving content to the standard of
reasonableness, the courts (first in Theodora, and then in both opinions in
Kahn v. Sullivan) implicitly analogized the corporation to a natural
person.' That is, in defining "reasonableness in amount" the courts
looked to the firms' capacity to alienate assets without impairing their
overall financial condition-something approximating the "reasonableness
in amount" of a natural person's charitable gifts. They also weighed the
financial benefits (including tax benefits) potentially accruing to the
corporate donors from their gifts in calculating their actual cost to the
corporation and its shareholders-and hence their reasonableness in
amount. 85 But the analogy to natural persons' philanthropy ignores the
operation of the corporate agency problem arising from managers' control
over corporate contributions-a fact which bears fundamentally on the
reasonableness of any amount of corporate charitable contributions. Just
as problematically, this line of reasoning fails to generate a definite,
predictable standard for determining the maximum allowable annual
amount of a company's charitable contributions.
The "reasonableness in purpose" standard has the potential to be
equally perplexing. However, as described earlier, by enacting the
modem corporate philanthropy laws, the state legislatures have resolved
the larger issue-that philanthropy is a reasonable corporate objective.
Accordingly, the "reasonableness in purpose" inquiry, as elaborated in
both Theodora and Kahn v. Sullivan, has been limited to the question of
the appropriate recipients of corporate charitable contributions, consistent
with the beneficiaries enumerated in the statutes (e.g., public welfare,
community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or
similar purposes).
Ultimately, in order to resolve the ambiguities surrounding the
determination of "reasonable" contributions, the Delaware courts, in both
the Theodora and the Kahn decisions, relied on standards imported from
the Federal Income Tax Code. The Code's maximum annual allowance
for the deductibility of corporate contributions under § 170-currently ten
percent of corporate pre-tax income86 -has been accepted as the
84. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991); Sullivan v. Hammer, [1990
Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 95,415 (Del. Ch. 11990); Theodora Holding Corp.
v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). For discussion of the tendency to reify
and personify the charitable corporation, and the theoretic problems arising therefrom,
see Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tar Treatment of Corporate
Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 835 (1997).
85. See id.
86. As a result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Congress amended the
ceiling for annual deductible charitable contributions by corporations from five percent
of corporate taxable income-which had been the rule at the time when Theodora was
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appropriate standard for "reasonableness in amount;" and the set of groups
qualifying for status as charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the
Code has been adopted as the standard for determining "reasonableness in
purpose." These tax-based standards have lent definiteness to the
interpretation of "reasonableness," and have allowed the courts to escape
further personification of the corporation.
Nevertheless, this clarity has been purchased at the expense of a kind
of conceptual void. The policy objectives underlying the Tax Code's
corporate philanthropy provisions-Congress' desire to encourage non-tax
based corporate expenditures on social and cultural affairs-are grossly
distinct from the traditionally shareholder-centered concerns of corporate
law.87 Thus, the Delaware courts' adoption of federal, tax-based standards
as the basis for defining the reasonableness of corporate charitable
contributions, while effective in "getting the job done," illustrates that the
traditional framework of state corporate law has provided insufficient
grounds to rationalize a system of philanthropically motivated corporate
contributions. The silence in the corporate philanthropy laws, and the
courts' importation of extra-corporate law standards to resolve the
interpretive problems resulting from these silences, reflects the existing
conceptual boundaries of corporate law.
decided-to ten percent (without regard to any net operating loss or capital loss carry
back). See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (1994).
87. Certain corporate legal scholars have reintensified the project of connecting
corporate law to disciplines other than neoclassical economics. See, e.g., MARGARET M.
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1995); Richard M. Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal
Doctrine, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 515 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy
in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276 (1984); David Millon, Communitarians,
Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993);
Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1565 (1993); Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform,
36 STAN. L. REv. 923 (1984); Simon, supra note 46. For a compelling argument that
a central project of contemporary legal scholarship is the construction of a new,
contextualized theory of our formative social institutions, including business corporations,
see Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process: The Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1393 (1996). And outside of corporate
legal scholarship, see, for example, SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY (1996), and, more
generally, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST (1995); George Soros, The Capitalist Threat,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 45.
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III. SHAREHOLDERS' LIMITED POWER TO OBTAIN SOCIALLY
SIGNIFICANT CORPORATE INFORMATION
UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
As described earlier, the early philanthropy laws which afforded
shareholders veto rights over contributions exceeding a prescribed level
presumed that shareholders would be notified of at least certain proposed
charitable contributions;"8 and two states, at different times, expressly
provided for disclosure of charitable contributions.8 9 In contrast, the
states' modem philanthropy laws fail to provide shareholders any right to
contributions information. In addition, the ordinary channels by which
shareholders obtain corporate information-through inspection of corporate
books and records or, in the context of publicly held companies, through
SEC-mandated filings and reportsgq-do not provide for disclosure of
corporate charitable contributions. This section of the essay examines the
limited nature of shareholders' informational rights, both in relation to
corporate charitable contributions and in regard to other socially significant
areas of corporate conduct, and considers the political implications of these
limits.
Under state law, shareholders have a right to inspect corporate books
and records. 91 However, in many states, as at common law, these rights
are qualified by a concept of "proper purpose."9' Most relevantly, it has
been generally accepted that a shareholder's inspection request may be
refused where it is motivated by a "social concern" unrelated to enhancing
88. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
90. In addition to state law inspection and periodic corporate reporting required by
the SEC, shareholders have obtained additional disclosure of matters affecting social
policy under SEC Rule 14a-8, the "shareholder proposal rule." See Roosevelt v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992). However, the SEC has
recently expanded its interpretation of "ordinary" corporate business, and thus diminished
the ability of shareholders to demand supplemental social disclosure through the
shareholder proposal process. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 76,418, at
77,284 (Oct. 13, 1992). For further discussion of shareholder proposals under the federal
proxy rules, see infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
91. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 96-105 (1986).
92. See id. at 97.
93. See id. at 100 ("Whatever the variations in statutory procedure, proper purpose
has become the substantive touchstone in most jurisdictions."). For statutory versions of
the proper purpose requirement see, for example, CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601(a) (West
1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1602 (West
1996); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.75 (West 1997); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(c)
(Consol. 1996).
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the firm's financial performance. 94 Under this rationale, ironically,
although corporations have legal authority to make charitable contributions
irrespective of business objectives, shareholders would not have a right to
inspect corporate records documenting such contributions absent a
business, that is, profit-motivated purpose. A desire to obtain
contributions information in order either to advocate increased giving in
the interest of society or to investigate the identities of particular
beneficiaries-as these concerns are unrelated to profit-
maximization-would not constitute a basis for inspection. Clearly there
is a "double standard" applied to corporate versus shareholder conduct in
this area. The corporate entity, which is to say its managers, have a
legally protected freedom to spend corporate funds on social concerns
unrelated to profit maximization, whereas shareholders lack even a right
to obtain information about such spending. The double standard reflects
a startling incongruity within corporate law: the disjunction between the
activist, charitable corporation and the law's otherwise uncompromising
commitment to conceiving of both the firm and corporate shareholders as,
properly, purely economic, profit maximizing units.95
The notion that corporate shareholders' interests are properly limited
to matters affecting financial performance is also reflected in the SEC's
disclosure requirements promulgated pursuant to the Federal Securities
Laws. The SEC has the authority to broaden the existing limits of
required corporate disclosure. In section 14(a) of the '34 Act, and
elsewhere in the Securities Laws, Congress has given the SEC authority
to promulgate disclosure provisions (and other rules) "in the public interest
or for the protection of investors" 96-a mandate plainly broad enough to
encompass disclosure of matters beyond corporate financial performance. 97
94. See National Consumers Union v. National Tea Co., 302 N.E.2d 118 (I11. App.
Ct. 1973); State ex. rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971).
95. For an example of the Commission's insistence that corporate shareholders'
interests are properly limited to economically material matters, see DIvISION OF CORP.
FIN., SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
(1980) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY].
96. '34 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a).
97. In describing the scope of its authority, the SEC has observed as follows:
The [Securities] Acts and the relevant legislative history also suggest that a
prime expectation of the Congress was that the Commission's disclosure
authority would be used to require the dissemination of information which is
or may be economically significant.
It is also evident, however, that insofar as the Commission's rulemaking
authority under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act is concerned, the
primacy of economic matters, particularly with respect to shareholder
proposals, is somewhat less.
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The SEC itself has expressed the view that its "discretion to determine
what disclosure is appropriate to fulfill its responsibilities under the federal
securities laws is extremely broad."98 But the Commission has been
extremely reluctant to give independent significance to the "public
interest" part of this mandate, or to interpret investors' interests in voting
and investment decisions as exceeding narrow economic parameters. 99
Securities Act Release No. 5627, [1975-76 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §
80,310, at 85,706, 85,710-11 (Oct. 14, 1975) [hereinafter Release No. 5627].
98. Id. at 85,713.
99. The argument for increased corporate disclosure of socially significant
information made herein received extensive consideration by the SEC and various
interested parties between 1969 and 1980. The contexts included the SEC's response to
a rulemaking petition filed by the Natural Resources Defense Council and certain ethical
investor groups on June 1, 1971, public proceedings on disclosure and corporate
accountability conducted by the SEC, and litigation in the federal courts. In each
instance, the Commission and its staff consistently opposed almost every attempt to
require enhanced disclosure of socially significant information, arguing that (1)
shareholders are fundamentally interested only in matters materially affecting corporate
financial performance and (2) broadened disclosure would be unduly costly, disruptive
and otherwise unfeasible. See THE WHEAT REPORT, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, STAFF
REPORT (1969) [hereinafter THE WHEAT REPORT]; Exchange Act Release No. 9252 ['70-
'71 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 78,150, at 80,487 (July 19, 1971) (clarifying
obligation to disclose environmental and civil rights matters when economically material);
Securities Act Release No. 5235, ['71-'72 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) §
78,524, at 81,134 (Feb. 16, 1972) (announcing proposed supplemental disclosure)
[hereinafter Release No. 5235]; Securities Act Release No. 5386, [1973 Decisions] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) § 79,342, at 83,029 (Apr. 20, 1973) (announcing decision not to
enlarge disclosure of environmental and employment matters) [hereinafter Release No.
5386]; Securities Act Release No. 5569 ['74-'75 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 80,110
at 85,109 (February 11, 1975) (announcing public proceedings on expanding social
disclosure); Release No. 5627, supra note 97 (announcing SEC's conclusion to adopt
minimal additional environmental disclosure requirements and no additional disclosure
requirement in the area of employment data); Exchange Act Release No. 13482, ['77-'78
Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 81,130, at 87,889 (Apr. 28, 1977) (announcing
public proceedings on corporate governance, shareholder participation and disclosure
matters) [hereinafter Release No. 13482]; Exchange Act Release No. 13901, ['77-'78
Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 81,296, at 88,461 (Aug. 29, 1977) (enumerating
questions to be considered regarding the expansion of social disclosure) [hereinafter
Release No. 13901]; STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 95
(discussing history and philosophy of SEC's continued opposition to expanded social
disclosure); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689
(D.D.C. 1974) (finding SEC in nonconformity with Administrative Procedure Act in
failing to give adequate notice of rulemaking proceeding on enhanced disclosure, and in
failing to supply rationale for decision to maintain disclosure status quo); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding
SEC's decision to reject expansion of environmental disclosures arbitrary and capricious,
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To appreciate the limits of required disclosure, it is necessary to
understand the organization and operation of the SEC's disclosure
regulations. Disclosure under the securities regulations follows two
general principles. First, there are specific disclosure requirements set
forth in the Securities Laws, 00 and, more amply, in the rules and forms
promulgated by the Commission.10' In addition to these specific disclosure
mandates, the antifraud provisions, and thus the concept of "materiality,"
affect what disclosure is required.10 2 Thus, the disclosure system is not an
organic whole, but rather a network of interrelated authorities and
principles. For this reason, the limits of required disclosure, and thus the
normative implications of those limits, are not readily apparent. As a
result, there is widespread misunderstanding regarding the actual breadth
of required corporate disclosure under the securities regulations.' 3
A variety of principles significantly limit required corporate
disclosure. First, the specific disclosure mandates enumerated in the
SEC's forms and the S-K regulations are limited to a fairly narrow range
of commercial and financial topics.'" In addition, the anti-fraud
provisions merely require disclosure of any supplementary information
necessary to complete the informational portrait rendered in response to
and decision to reject disclosure of employment data lacking a rational basis, rev 'd, 606
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979); H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980); S. 2567, 96th Cong.
(1980).
100. See, e.g., '33 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994) (registration and prospectus
requirements in connection with public offerings of securities); '34 Act § 13(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (annual and periodic reporting requirements); '34 Act § 13(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994) (requirements for issuer tender offers); '34 Act § 14(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994) (requirements for proxy solicitations).
101. See, e.g., Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1997); Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.308a (1997); Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1997); Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-101 (1997); Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1997); Schedule 14A,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1997) [hereinafter collectively Forms); see also Regulation S-
K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1994); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210 (1996).
102. For example, SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits any solicitation of a proxy based on a
material misstatement or omission of fact. See SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9
(1997); see also '33 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994) (prohibiting fraud in offer
or sale of securities); '34 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) (prohibiting
manipulative or deceptive practices in purchase or sale of securities).
103. For example, in numerous conversations I have observed that even attorneys
knowledgeable and sophisticated in the area of corporate and securities law were surprised
to learn of the absence of required disclosure of charitable contributions.
104. This reflects the Commission's view that Congress intended that the SEC would
craft regulations protective of shareholders' economic interests. For the SEC's statements
in this regard see Release No. 5627, supra note 97, at 85,710.
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the financially-driven, line-item disclosure requirements.° 5 As a result,
the anti-fraud provisions neither "require disclosure of all material
information" (as commentators frequently describe in shorthand), nor
enlarge upon the kinds of information corporations must disclose.
10 6
Moreover, companies are under no continuous or general duty to disclose
even all the "material" information in their possession;17 and,
furthermore, the concept of "material information" is a fairly narrow term
of art. "All material information" does not encompass the full range of
corporate information which actual investors might consider important.' 08
In fact, although both the SEC and the courts have described the concept
105. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-06, 230.408, 240.14a-3(b)(3) (1997).
106. For example, although the Staff Report on Corporate A ccountability states that
"The Commission's proxy rules include the requirement that all 'material' facts be
disclosed in proxy and information statements," in fact the disclosure mandate arising
from the antifraud provision of the proxy rules is not nearly so comprehensive. STAFF
REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 95, at 260. Rather, Rule 14a-9(a)
provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to
correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the
solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading (emphasis added).
Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1997).
107. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); Levine v. NL Indus., 926 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir.
1991).
108. Although the SEC and the courts describe the body of material information in
terms of the information desired by reasonable investors, the system is not designed to
monitor and reflect the actual interests of real investors. Rather, the SEC's disclosure
system operates on the basis of a reified "reasonable investor." This issue-whether the
disclosure system should be "responsive" to actual shareholders' disclosure
preferences-was addressed by the SEC in its proceedings during the mid-1970's. For
example in Release No. 5627, the SEC stated "We have serious reservations as to
whether Commission rulemaking can be premised upon an attempt to quantify investor
interest . . . ." Release No. 5627, supra note 97, at 85,719. The SEC defended the
propriety of operating independent of "the actual interests of investors," on the rationale
that a statistical survey "would at best produce results that might rapidly become outdated
in light of the shifting and fluctuating nature of public opinion and the focus of popular
attention from time to time." Id. at 85,712. The SEC concluded that reference to the
actual interests of investors "would not have been workable and would have been totally
unstable." Id. The Commission has thus manufactured a scheme of disclosure which
reflects its own view of what investors should be interested in.
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of materiality in terms of the information desired by "reasonable"
investors, the SEC has applied the concept of materiality in narrow, purely
economic terms.'09
Rule 405 of the '33 Act (which has been influential in interpreting '34
Act disclosure requirements as well) defines material information as that
information "to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the
security registered." 1 And in TSC v. Northway, the United States
Supreme Court held that a "fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote."" Although these regulations and the cases
interpreting them suggest that the interest of reasonable investors in the
disclosure of information will be met by the SEC's requirements, these
authorities have in fact limited the scope of required disclosure according
to an unstated criterion of economic materiality. In addition, they have
failed to explain why shareholders' interest in corporate conduct of social
but not immediate economic significance is not "reasonable. " "'
In light of the foregoing, the absence of a disclosure requirement in
the charitable contributions area is unmysterious. First, from the
perspective of economic materiality, there is no indication that the SEC is
aware of the increased size of the charitable donations which are made by
many major public corporations. Indeed, the SEC's probable ignorance
on this matter is unsurprising, in light of the fact that company-specific
contributions data is not routinely made publicly available, and relatively
little academic study or popular commentary has been devoted to this
109. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 95, at
262-76.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1996); see also SEC Rule 12b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2
(1997).
111. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
112. The point was made by Judge Richey in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC:
There are many so-called "ethical investors" in this country who want to invest their
assets in firms which are concerned about and acting on enviromental problems of
the nation. This attitude may be based purely upon a concern for the environment;
but it may also proceed from the recognition that awareness of and sensitivity to
environmental problems is the mark of intelligent management. Whatever their
motive, this Court is not prepared to say that they are not rational investors and that
the information they seek is not material information within the meaning of the
securities laws (emphasis added).
389 F. Supp. 689, 700 (D.D.C. 1974). Nevertheless, in subsequent stages of the
litigation the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in forcing the SEC to respond to their interests
in broadened disclosure. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 432 F.
Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 606 F. 2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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subject. Yet even if the Commission was aware of the expanded
dimensions of contemporary corporate giving, the standard of economic
materiality applied by the SEC is in the range of five percent or even ten
percent of annual corporate profits." 3 Thus, many public corporations
could make annual donations of tens of millions of dollars without meeting
the SEC's threshold of economic materiality. "
4
In addition, there are non-economic rationales for requiring disclosure
of corporate charitable contributions. Shareholders may wish to alter the
amount or chosen beneficiaries of the company's philanthropy, or they
may seek to ascertain whether the expenditures are in conformity with
their personal beliefs. But although the SEC has acknowledged its
obligation to promote "the fair opportunity for corporate suffrage," it has
chosen largely to ignore nonmonetary shareholder interests in promulgating
its regulations. One exception to this monetized view of shareholders'
interests has been in the area of shareholder proposals. The SEC has
created the opportunity for investors to submit proposals on matters of
social significance independent of the usual criterion of economic
materiality. "' But the Commission has always been uncertain about its
113. For example, although Item 103 of the S-K regulations requires disclosure of
'material pending legal proceedings," the instructions to the rule clarify that no disclosure
is required with respect to any proceeding "that involves primarily a claim for damages
if the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the
current assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis." Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1996). Even the disclosure of litigation arising under federal,
state or local environmental provisions is, with narrow exception, governed by a "10
percent of the current assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries" standard. Id.
114. For example, in 1995, General Motors earned $4.9 billion and Exxon Corp.
earned $7.5 billion. See Robert J. Sherwood, The Forbes 500s Profits, FORBES, Apr.
21, 1997, at 188. On this basis, annual charitable contributions of less than $490 million
and $750 million, respectively, would not only conform to the existing state law
standards, but might not even meet the threshold economic standard for required
disclosure.
115. SEC Rule 14a-8 of the '34 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8, the so-called
shareholder proposal rule, provides shareholders a mechanism to have their proposals
submitted to a vote of shareholders through inclusion in the company's proxy. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997). Nevertheless, the Rule includes 13 grounds for a company's
exclusion of the shareholder's proposal from the corporate proxy statement. See id.
Substantial controversy has surrounded the exclusions for matters not sufficiently
economically material to the company and matters relating to the conduct of the
company's ordinary business; that is, exceptions (c)(5) and (c)(7) under the Rule.
Nevertheless, from the late 1970's until the early 1990's, the SEC and the Staff of the
Division of Corporate Finance had refused to sanction exclusion under these provisions
where a shareholder's proposal related to a significant matter of social policy, independent
of the usual criterion of economic materiality.
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position on "social proposals,"116 and since 1992 it has sought to narrow
shareholders' ability to force the inclusion of social proposals in corporate
proxies. "'
The narrower scope given to socially significant shareholder proposals
and the absence of a charitable contributions disclosure requirement is
especially problematic in light of recent developments. As Nancy Knauer
has described, 1 8 Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, as well as recent
Congresses, have taken an active interest in encouraging corporate
charitable contributions. These efforts have included sponsoring the
creation of nonprofit corporations they hoped would be funded primarily
by corporate contributions. Most recently, the need for increased
corporate giving was an important theme of the "Presidents' Summit on
America's Future," held in Philadelphia at the end of April, 1997." 9 The
featured speakers included Nancy Reagan, George Bush, Bill Clinton, -Al
Gore, and General Colin Powell. Thus, while the Congress and prominent
politicians have sought to create new incentives for corporations to use
116. Because it is so critical to shareholders' ability to voice their concerns, the
shareholder proposal rule has been the subject of substantial controversy and persistent
amendment by the Commission. The literature on shareholder proposals is large. For
a concise history and (negative) critique of its operation, see Richard Y. Roberts,
Shareholder Proposal Reforn-A Search for Objectivity in Rule 14a-8, 22 SEC. REG. L.J.
235-46 (1994).
117. For example, in 1993 the Commission approved the determination of the Staff
of the Division of Corporate Finance that shareholder proposals relating to general
employment could be excluded by companies, under exception (c)(7) of Rule 14a-8, as
.ordinary business"-notwithstanding the relevance of social policy issues. See Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) § 76,418, at 77,284 (Oct. 13, 1992). In response, the shareholder
which had submitted the proposal, the New York City Employees' Retirement System
(NYCERS), sued the SEC for failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
in altering its interpretation of the Rule. Although NYCERS suceeded at the district court
level, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the SEC. The upshot of the
controversy is that the SEC has expanded its authority to deny shareholders access to the
proxy under an enlarged view of what is "ordinary [corporate] business." Shareholders
who disagree with the SEC's determination that a given proposal is excludable as
"ordinary business," and a company's consequent decision to exclude it, are faced with
the costly prospect of suing individual companies to force inclusion of the proposal. For
the argument that expanding the ordinary business exclusion, and thus the ability of
shareholders to submit socially significant proposals, represents a move towards
objectivity see Roberts, supra note 116.
118. See Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional
Choice and Government Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 945
(1997).
119. See T.J. Rodgers, Holding Up the Shareholder, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997,
at A23.
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charitable contributions to subsidize federally-sponsored social policy
initiatives, the SEC has limited shareholders' power to have a voice in, or
even knowledge of, corporate social expenditures. 20
Furthermore, recent campaign finance controversies (including the
official reprimand of the current Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich)'2'
have illuminated how corporations have used charitable contributions to
influence federal election campaigns." Such expenditures are highly
controversial, in light of the Tax Code's prohibition of electoral politicking
by nonprofit organizations," as well as the Federal Election Campaign
Act's prohibition on corporate campaign contributions. 124 Nevertheless,
in light of the relevance of corporate free speech guarantees, and for more
political reasons,'2 it is unlikely that legal reform will significantly limit
the political influence of public policy institutes, 126 and hence the ability
120. The SEC's conservative stance in regard to shareholder proposals might
potentially be forced to change as a result of the findings of a study mandated by the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. Congress asked the SEC to study
"whether shareholder access to proxy statements . . . has been impaired by recent
statutory, judicial, or regulatory changes" and to evaluate "the ability of shareholders to
have proposals relating to corporate practices and social issues included as part of proxy
statements." National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
290, § 510(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).
121. In January of 1997, in response to the findings resulting from an Ethics
Committee investigation, the House of Representatives voted to reprimand the Speaker
and to fine him $300,000. Mr. Gingrich was found to have been insufficiently attentive
to the legal limits pertaining to activities of his political action committee and a network
of politicized charitable organizations which benefited him in his campaign for office.
For further discussion of Mr. Gingrich's relationship to certain politicized charitable
organizations, see Kahn, Corporate Philanthropy, supra note 1, at 644-51.
122. See id. at Part V.
123. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (prohibiting on charitable organizations'
participation in elections and in "substantial" lobbying).
124. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1994).
125. Politicians themselves-because they are under constant fund-raising
pressure-have a stake in quashing reforms which would limit their access to corporate
funds. In the fall of 1997, both the Senate and the House held hearings on campaign
finance reform which were marked by highly partisan battles.
126. Public policy institutes or "think tanks" are active in influencing politics and
policy formation in ways which extend beyond electoral politics. For example, the New
York Times recently reported on the "research arm" of the National Governors
Association, which received millions of dollars in tax deductible contributions from major
corporations including AT&T, Exxon, General Motors, Dow Chemical, Pfizer, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, Philip Morris and Goldman, Sachs & Company. The National
Governors Association defended the practice in terms of assuring the availability of "the
best advice on important issues," but critics view the donations as affording big business
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of corporations to use charitable contributions to subsidize their political
activities. In this regard, the absence of a corporate charitable
contributions disclosure requirement serves powerful political interests.
Of course, the limits of required corporate disclosure are more
troubling for the fact that they are implicit rather than express. As
described above, the securities regulations do not give notice of the fact
that they require disclosure of only a narrow range of corporate
conduct-conduct deemed economically material by the SEC. 27 Because
the SEC's disclosure requirements do not articulate the normative
principles which define them (that is, the narrow and essentially economic
interpretation of materiality and the limited scope of the line-item
disclosure requirements), we-as investors, commentators, or legislators-
are less likely to "miss" what we do not see. As was true in regard to the
states' modern corporate philanthropy laws, we are unlikely to perceive the
significance of what has been left unstated. By keeping this vital, defining
aspect of their architecture unstated, the securities regulations have
contributed to the widespread misperception that they require disclosure of
all the corporate information in which investors might reasonably be
interested. This misperception has given investors and the public a false
sense of confidence in the transparency of corporate conduct.
While the SEC has potrayed itself as attempting to "stick to business"
in establishing the limits of required disclosure, its policies have had
undeniable political implications: they have supported the concentration of
not only economic but also social power in the hands of corporate
management. Once the limits of SEC-required corporate disclosure
become apparent, one must question why the standards of accountability
which apply to the exercise of governmental power (and which underlie
the Freedom of Information Act, for example) are inapplicable to
corporate conduct. Even if we accept the propriety of centralized, board
control in many areas of corporate affairs (as we accept the notion of
"representative" democracy), prospective investors surely have a right to
base their investment and voting decisions on a broadened universe of
information, including "socially significant information," if they so
choose. In light of the widespread unavailability of corporate social
information, it is insufficient to argue that shareholders are free to invest
"elsewhere." In addition, a justification for limited corporate disclosure
"a lobbying advantage unavailable to their adversaries on major policy issues." John H.
Cushman Jr., Corporate Gifts Help Gain Access to U.S. Governors, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 1997, at Al.
127. This "exclusionary" work is done, again, by the absence of line-item disclosure
requirements in regard to charitable and political contributions, and most environmental,
employment, and product safety information; and also by virtue of the limited definition
of "materiality" which has been employed by the SEC and the federal courts.
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which points to the "private" nature of corporate affairs is increasingly
suspect in a political climate in which the government is dedicated to
shifting traditionally public functions to the "private" sector. 28 This trend
towards privatization should force a reconsideration of the limits of
"rights" in a corporate-dominated world, and the limited power of
shareholders to obtain socially relevant corporate information.
Interestingly, although the SEC's regulations fail to articulate a
justification for their exclusion of most socially significant information, the
Commission addressed itself to this question in certain litigation and
proceedings held in the 1970s. 129 Although the SEC failed to expand the
disclosure status quo significantly as a result of these proceedings, the
proceedings did succeed in forcing the agency's views into the open. In
a series of releases and reports issued by the Commission and its staff
from the mid to late 1970s,"30 the SEC presented arguments supporting its
decision to decline to expand corporate disclosure. Most of the SEC's
arguments against expanded disclosure were practical, rather than
conceptual or philosophical in nature; and twenty years later, in light of
changed circumstances, these practical arguments should be reevaluated.
The SEC had argued that the transaction costs of social disclosure
were prohibitive, in relation to the amount of investor interest. Yet the
continued vitality of "social choice" investing (notwithstanding the existing
informational hurdles which hinder the practice)' suggests that there is
128. The issue of privatization within the United States has arisen in regard to the
funding of the arts, management of welfare reform and other social services, waste and
water management, as well as the administration of schools and prisons, for example.
See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Privatization Temptation, CONN. L. TRiB., Oct. 21, 1996,
at 23; Gary Peller, The New Private Lav: Public Imperialism & Private Resistance, 73
DENY. U. L. REv. 1001 (1996); Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 6 (1988); Robert H. Wessel, Privatization in the United States, Bus.
ECON., Oct. 1995, at 45.
129. See supra note 99.
130. See Release Nos. 5235, 5386, 13482, 13901, supra note 99; Release No.
5627, supra note 97; THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 99; STAFF REPORT ON
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 95.
131. The need for mandatory corporate reporting of environmental, employment and
contributions data through SEC-mandated filings is accentuated by the fact that such
information is often difficult or impossible to obtain from public agencies on a timely
basis. In addition, corporations do not consistently voluntarily comply with informational
requests from shareholders or the public. According to Paul Hilton, a social research
analyst at Smith Barney, although substantial progress has been made in regard to
pollution data (on the basis of the Community Right to Know Act and the Toxic Release
Inventory), EEO-1 forms, which are filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, may be obtained from individual companies only upon their consent or,
otherwise, in many but not all cases, through correspondence with the Contract and
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substantial investor interest in corporate social policies, both among
individual and institutional investors. 32 In addition, because of increased
investor interest in corporate social policies, as well as the presence of
increased regulation (and penalties) affecting corporate hiring, employment
and environmental policies, corporate conduct which is socially
irresponsible is frequently also financially reckless.'33
The SEC has also argued that the costs of producing and disseminating
this socially significant information are prohibitive, and that an
"avalanche" of social information would undermine the system. However,
recent changes in information technology, including low cost web sites and
software systems which include word-search capabilities, alter the potential
costs associated with furnishing investors with social information, and
diminish the dangers of informational "overload." In particular, it is easy
to imagine a system in which interested shareholders would be furnished
with a computer disk or, alternatively, would log on to a company's web
site containing socially relevant corporate information, in which they could
"word-search" for the particular matters about which they were
concerned.' 34 Furthermore, in many areas of social concern, including
Compliance Office of the Department of Labor. Most social choice investing is
conducted on the basis of reports compiled by a few professional organizations such as
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc., which are specifically dedicated to amassing the
available data. Although helpful in systematizing this data, these organizations have no
superior access to the kind of corporate information under discussion. Telephone
Interview with Paul Hilton, Social Research Analyst, Smith Barney (May 15, 1997). For
futher discussion of "socially responsible" investing, see George Djurasovic, The
Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 22 IowA J. CORP. L. 257 (1997); see
also Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing
Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1992).
132. Furthermore, the SEC's disclosure policies themselves affect or even shape
investor interest, since people cannot become concerned about corporate social issues
unless they have significant information about them.
133. The costs associated with employment discrimination suits have reached the tens
of millions of dollars, for example. In the first half of 1997, a settlement of $176 million
was approved in a race discrimination case against Texaco, while Publix Super Markets
settled a claim of sex discrimination for $81.5 million.
134. On-line information services will inevitably alter the debate over corporate
social disclosure. For example, the annual Toxics Release Inventory, credited with
"encouraging companies to voluntarily control their pollution," is currently published on-
line, as well as in hard copy. See John H. Cushman, Jr., E.P.A. Is Pressing Plan To
Publicize Pollution Data, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at Al. Furthermore, the E.P.A.
is currently working on a new initiative named the Sector Facility Indexing Project which
would consolidate such information as plant emissions, spills, inspections, and penalties
relating to factories in five industries and present it in an accessible form on the agency's
World Wide Web site. While the industries are trying to block the project on the grounds
that it will "confuse and alarm the public," the New York Times described it as "the most
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corporate charitable contributions, corporations are presently required to
compile and to organize a substantial amount of data, either to comply
with existing regulations or to respond to potential governmental inquiries
(such as income tax audits of charitable deductions). For this reason,
corporate disclosure could be broadened substantially without adding
significant information gathering costs for firms.
The political ramifications of limited corporate social disclosure must
also be considered. Limited corporate social disclosure has enhanced the
ability of corporate managers to affect the workforce, the community and
the environment without having to be accountable to investors or the
public for their acts and decisions. Reasonable persons may disagree
about the optimum level of direct shareholder participation in corporate
affairs, but the question of participation is distinct from the prior question
of knowledge and information. Limited social disclosure has abridged
shareholders' power to exercise their existing voting and investment rights
consistent with social conscience concerns. Furthermore, by limiting
disclosure according to a norm of economic materiality, the SEC has
validated and institutionalized a system in which investors are encouraged
to ignore the social implications of most corporate conduct.
The political and normative content of the SEC's regulations should
be recognized and addressed more fully. The SEC's position in limiting
shareholders' access to socially significant corporate information (and,
thus, corporate power) has been inherently conservative and elitist, and
neither the Commission nor (at various instances) the individual
commissioners, have been entirely forthright in this regard. In particular,
in electing to preserve the disclosure status quo after the proceedings and
litigation of the 1970s, as well as in its recent efforts to limit shareholder
proposals on matters of social concern, 35 the agency has defended its
positions in terms of preserving the "neutrality" or "objectivity" of the
agency and of the investment process generally.
3 6
innovative step so far in a steady campaign by the Clinton Administration to expand 'right
to know' initiatives." Id. If the project is realized, "anyone with a computer and a
modem could browse through data that, while held in public files, are usually inaccessible
to most citizens." Id. Such initiatives will pressure companies to coordinate their own
environmental disclosure with that required by the E.P.A.
135. See supra notes 99, 117.
136. The Commission has historically defended its reliance on a standard of
economic materiality on the basis that it provides an objective standard for required
disclosure. See Release No. 5627, supra note 97, at E-10-13; STAFF REPORT ON
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 95 at 269. In addition, the idea that commerce
is somehow neutral, and to be protected against the influence of meddlesome, activist
investors, is implicit in the notion of "ordinary business" as it operates in the SEC's
shareholder proposal rule. See supra note 117. Furthermore, in response to the problem
of deciding which employment proposals constitute ordinary business, and would
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This notion of neutrality is unsound and misleading. Because the SEC
has assumed primary responsibility for administering the shareholder
voting process and regulating the flow of information to investors in public
companies, there is no neutral position available to the SEC. Whatever
rules the Commission adopts will substantially affect the allocation of
power between corporate managers and corporate investors. Thus, the
accepted exclusion of social disclosure, as well as the recent drive to limit
shareholder proposals on social matters, has not made the SEC neutral or
objective, has not made investing neutral or objective and has not made
corporate conduct socially or politically neutral or objective. Rather than
a move towards neutrality or objectivity, limiting the ability of
shareholders to know about and to express their views about socially
significant corporate conduct has merely institutionalized a form of silence
at the expense of corporate shareholders and the broader community.
This bureaucratic intensification in the corporate form, and the lack of
transparency surrounding it, has encouraged the devaluation of individual
responsibility (limited information discourages shareholder interest and
influence) and, in turn, even corporate responsibility (limited information
limits corporate accountability). If shareholders were to become more
informed, and if they elected to use their influence to affect corporate
social policy, they might or might not pay a price in terms of investment
return,137 but the current regime of enforced ignorance carries its own
price. Limited corporate social disclosure has fostered a false distinction
between shareholders as investors and shareholders as citizens. It is time
for the SEC's disclosure system to be broadened to allow for moral and
social values, as well as economic ones.
therefore be excludable by corporations, the Staff (with full Commission endorsement)
has determined to consider all such proposals as ordinary business-as if this blanket
decision to allow exclusion represents a return to objectivity. See id. ("In recent years,
however, the line between includable and excludable employment-related proposals based
on social policy considerations has become increasingly difficult to draw . . . . As a
result, the Division has determined that the fact that a shareholder proposal concerning
a company's employment policies and practices for the general workforce is tied to a
social issue will no longer be viewed as removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary
business operations of the registrant.") In sum, there has been a confusion between the
search for standards based on objective criteria, and the inherently non-neutral, politically
significant role of the SEC in policing corporate disclosure. See Roberts, supra note 115;
but cf. Steven M.H. Wallman, Equality is More Than Ordinary Business, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1997, at § 3 (Money & Business), at 12; John J. Coffee, Jr., Blocking Bias Via
Reform, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at A14.
137. The New York Times recently reported that corporate America implemented
required environmental reforms throughout the late 1970s and 1980s at costs which were
substantially less than they had feared and protested. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Cooling
Down the Heated Talk, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1997, at Dl.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The modem philanthropy laws establish legal grounds for an "activist"
corporation. Rather than dissolving into a "nexus of contracts," the
philanthropic firm is a social institution which may actively engage the
culture and community which surrounds it. While the influence of the law
and economics movement has highlighted the private, contractual aspect
of corporate law and notions of allocative efficiency, the philanthropy
laws, in contrast, deal with distributive issues. For this reason, and
because they authorize corporate managers to administer social as well as
economic resources, the philanthropy laws are fundamentally political in
nature. Indeed, as discussed above, they cannot be adjudged according to
the ordinary commercial or fiduciary standards applied by courts in the
corporate context.
The active involvement of the bar and community nonprofit
organizations provides a historical explanation for the genesis of these
laws, and reminds us that law is a cultural and political artifact, rather than
the product of inhuman, evolutionary forces. But the concise nature of the
philanthropy laws begs the hard questions about corporate giving, leaving
these laws "ungrounded." Indeed, it is likely that the philanthropy laws
have escaped controversy because they are sufficiently terse as to seem
inconsequential, because they have been camouflaged by the rest of the
enabling corporate laws, and because they fail to provide for company-
specific required disclosure, which would focus attention on them.
While corporate law has accommodated the notion of the socially
active corporation, neither corporate law nor the securities regulations have
afforded investors a reliable means of obtaining information about
corporate charitable and political contributions, or most employment
practices and environmental matters. By interpreting concepts such as
"reasonable investors," and "materiality," according to exclusively
economic norms, the SEC has sought to limit controversy regarding these
aspects of corporate conduct. Limited social disclosure has also signalled
to investors that they are free to disregard the social effects of corporate
business. Although the Commission may continue to oppose expanded
corporate social disclosure, these subjects-corporate community
involvement, corporate political participation, environmental
contamination, and fairness and humane practices in employment
matters-show every sign of remaining prominent on the political and
journalistic landscape and significant to the operation of corporate
business. For these reasons it is unlikely that the SEC will continue to
succeed in warding off controversy by arguing that corporate social
disclosures are either impracticable or unimportant.
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